The British battle fleet, Vol. 2 (of 2) — Background and Themes
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ned by Sir E. J. Reed, which went into the British service as the _Neptune_. Save that she carried 38-ton guns instead of 25-ton, she reproduced the _Monarch_ idea almost exactly. After certain vicissitudes she entered the British service, and eventually was fitted with a couple of military masts. The points of special interest about her were that (1) owing to some error her funnels were put in sideways instead of as designed; and (2) in service in any bad weather the sea regularly washed out her wardroom; (3) she was the first ship of the British Navy to carry a bath-room. As an effective warship she never figured to any large extent.
The other three purchased ships had been destined for the Turkish Navy; and all three turned out worse than the _Neptune_. The _Hamidieh_, re-christened _Superb_, more or less duplicated the _Hercules_. She took part in the bombardment of Alexandria a little later, and it was there discovered that her guns could not train at all well in comparison with contemporary British naval ships.
Of the fighting value of the other two ships, _Pakyi-Shereef_ and _Boordyi-Zaffir_, which became the _Belleisle_ and _Orion_, the least said the better. They turned out to be nothing but improvements on a type of “coast defender,” already obsolete, diminutives of the original Reed broadside idea applied to a _Hotspur_ type hull. In place of the single 25-ton gun of the _Hotspur_, they carried four similar guns--the old 12-inch 25-ton M.L. These guns were carried in a central raised battery, from which, as in the _Hotspur_, one gun could always bear, and from which two bearing on an exact and unlikely broadside might be looked for.
No useful service was ever performed by these ships. The _Belleisle_ ended her service as a target, the _Orion_ as a hulk. They proved conclusively that the central battery idea was obsolete and so far probably did good service. In the past Sir E. J. Reed had argued, and for that matter proved, that for a given weight of armour and armament eight guns, four on either broadside, could be mounted with equal protection and economy of weight as against two pairs of guns in turrets.[3] The _Belleisle_ gave the lie to this idea, however, when it came to be applied to half the number of guns. The step from that to the same thing with more guns was made easy, and the turret idea assured, out of the _Belleisle_ type. To the _Belleisle_ and _Orion_ more than any other ships may be traced the first real appreciation of “angles in between”--the demonstration that “right ahead” or “right on the broadside” were ideal positions which no enemy would willingly assume.
The _Devastation_ and her sisters had, of course, anticipated this idea; but to the _Belleisle_, at most fighting angles only able to bring a quarter of her battery into action, may be traced most modern developments in gun disposition.
Contemporaneous with the special Barnaby ships, reference may be made to the entirely nondescript _Téméraire_. She may be described as an absolute hybrid--partly Reed, partly Barnaby, partly gun inventors of the era, and partly nothing in particular.
Details of this ship are:--
Displacement--8,540 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--285ft.
Armament--Four 25-ton 11-inch M.L. (two in barbettes), four 18-ton M.L.--two above water torpedo tubes.
Armour (iron)--Complete 11--8in. belt. Bulkheads 8--5in. Barbettes 10--8in. Battery 10--8in. Horse-power--7,520 = 14.5 knots.
Coal--620 tons = 2,680 miles at economical speed (nominal).
The _Téméraire_ was unique in the world’s navies in that two of her 25-ton guns were carried--one forward, one aft--on special Moncrieff mountings, an adaption for naval purposes of the “disappearing gun,” invented for forts of that era. The gun, loaded under cover, was raised to fire by hydraulic mechanism, and then recoiled to the loading position. The ship was otherwise essentially of the Reed box-battery type; the other two 25-ton guns being in a central main-deck battery, and capable of a good deal of ahead fire. The other big guns (18 tons) were cut off from the 25-ton by an armoured bulkhead, and merely had the ordinary broadside training.
Like the _Inflexible_, the _Téméraire_ had a heavy brig rig. Towards the end of her active service career this was replaced by a military rig; but all her active work was done as a brig. She was built at Chatham Dockyard, engined by Humphrys, and completed for sea in 1877.
In 1882 she was at the bombardment of Alexandria, and there did more execution than any other ship. Her subsequent career was uneventful, and in her own way she was a “monstrosity” as much as the _Polyphemus_ was. She is generally understood to have been a “naval officers’ ideal” ship, rather than the regular production of the Chief Constructor. Whether this be true is, at least, doubtful. Certainly she may equally well be regarded as the forlorn hope of those who looked to see the general principles of the central battery system adapted to suit the new ideas as to ironclads. French ideas[4] also had probably something to do with her peculiar design.
The idea embodied in the _Inflexible_ was so pleasing to the authorities of that period that she was duplicated in two smaller vessels of the same type, the _Ajax_ and _Agamemnon_, though the precise purpose for which these vessels were built is difficult to fathom. They were in every way inferior to the _Inflexible_, and mainly of interest as indicating the definite abandonment of the idea of the masted battleship, and they were also the last ships to mount muzzle-loading guns:--
Particulars of these ships were:--
Displacement--8,660 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--280ft.
Draught (mean)--24ft.
Guns--Four 38-ton M.L., two 6-inch 81-cwt. B.L.
These were followed by the _Colossus_ and _Edinburgh_, which were laid down in 1879. In these ships the 12-inch breechloader was adopted, and an attempt at what was then a very considerable speed was made. An auxiliary armament made its first really definite appearance, five 6-inch guns being mounted on the superstructure.
Particulars of these ships were:--
Displacement--9,420 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--325ft.
Draught (mean)--26ft. 3ins.
Guns--Four 45-ton B.L.R., five 6-inch, 89-cwt. do.
At and about the same time considerable interest was being taken in rams. This resulted in the laying down of the _Conqueror_, a species of improved _Rupert_, and a type of ship destined to be enlarged upon in the future.
Particulars of the _Conqueror_ were:--
Displacement--6,200 tons.
Armament--Two 45-ton B.L.R., four 6-inch 89-cwt. do., six 14-inch torpedo tubes (above water).
Horse-power--(maximum) 6,000.
The _Conqueror_ was launched in September, 1881. Some three years later a sister, the _Hero_, was laid down, and launched towards the end of 1885. She differed from the _Conqueror_ only in that all four of her 6-inch guns were mounted on the superstructure, whereas the _Conqueror_ carried two of them on the main deck inside the superstructure.
Although developed from the _Rupert_, the _Conqueror_ differed a good deal in appearance, on account of the whole of the after part of the ship being one huge superstructure. In her, the superstructure, as a very definite feature instead of a mere accessory, may be said to have made its first appearance, to remain as a factor of growing importance for many years.
Contemporaneously with these ships two entirely different types made their appearance. One of these was the “torpedo ram” _Polyphemus_, an absolutely unique vessel, the outcome (though not so designed) of the influence of the torpedo. The ship was never duplicated, and never performed much service, but it would be rash to assert that the future may not see something like her re-appear. She was first projected as a “ram” pure and simple, so long ago as 1873, and designed by Barnaby to suit the specifications of certain naval officers as embodying their ideals of the warship of the future. This is the generally accepted theory, though Sir N. Barnaby[5] has made public a somewhat different view of the matter, and according to him, Admiral Sir George Sartorius, the naval officer principally concerned, lost his interest in the _Polyphemus_ when it was decided to give her an armament of torpedo tubes and some quick-firers against torpedo attack. So far as can be gauged, the torpedo tubes were likewise a naval innovation with which Sir N. Barnaby was also not much in sympathy. At any rate, he has put on record the view[5] that:--
“The introduction of torpedoes made the ship far more costly than she need have been, and it is possible that the type would have been continued and improved had the simplicity of the ram been adhered to.”
The _Polyphemus_ performed little useful service; her life on the Navy List was short; and she is always spoken of as a “failure.” Officers who served in her were, however, invariably enthusiastic about her, and had war occurred during the time that she was in existence there is no telling what she might have accomplished or how profoundly she might have affected naval construction.
In essence the _Polyphemus_ was a semi-submerged craft, those parts of her which were above water being merely a light superstructure for the accommodation of her crew in peace time.
She was of 2,640 tons displacement, length 240ft. between perpendiculars, beam 40ft., and a normal mean draught of 20ft. In form she was cigar-shaped, plated with 3-inch armour on the upper part of her curved sides. With 5,520 I.H.P. she had the then very high speed of 17.8 knots. She carried 300 tons of coal, sufficient for a nominal radius of 3,400 miles at economical speed.
Her principal feature, however, was the fitting of five submerged tubes, one in the bow the others on the broadside. For repelling a torpedo attack she carried six 6-pounders and a couple of machine guns.
It is here of interest to relate that some years later the U.S. Navy created a species of _Polyphemus_ imitation in the “ram” _Katahdin_. To a certain extent they had anticipated her likewise in the _Alarm_, 720 tons, launched in 1873, which carried a 15-inch smooth-bore gun _under water_ in her ram, and the _Intrepid_ (launched 1873), of 1,123 tons, of which no details ever transpired, and it may be said that she was “strangled at birth.” But the _Polyphemus’s_ ancestry is undoubtedly American. The _Katahdin_ (first produced as the “ram” _Ammen_) was not launched till 1893. She was of 2,050 tons and seventeen knots, and having no torpedo tubes, being a “ram” pure and simple, exactly reproduced the Sartorious-Barnaby idea. She soon disappeared from the U.S. Navy List, and she never did anything. She doubled the armour of the _Polyphemus_, whilst lacking her torpedo armament. Since then, the idea has found expression in three small U.S. “semi-submerged” boats, with the torpedo as their main armament; but these three boats never got beyond the “designed” stage. No other nation ever exhibited the least interest in the _Polyphemus_ idea.
Reference has already been made to the _Shannon_, which was the first armoured cruiser of the British Navy. She was launched towards the end of 1875 and completed two years later. In substance she was a development of the idea which first found expression in the _Inconstant_, heavy armament being preferred to the protection of the guns. A narrow belt of armour with a maximum thickness of 9-ins. protected three-quarters of the water-line. This belt commenced at the stern and ended in a bulkhead some 70ft. from the bow. Forward of this bulkhead was an under-water protective deck, and a certain amount of armour was concentrated on the ram under water. The bulkhead, which was from 9in. to 8in. thick, rose to the upper deck, and afforded protection to a couple of 18-ton muzzle-loaders, capable of right-ahead fire. The remainder of her armament consisted of seven 12½ton guns, and was entirely unprotected.
Other details of the ship are as follows:--
Displacement--5,390 tons.
Coal carried--580 tons = nominal economical radius of 2,260 miles.
The speed of the _Shannon_ was so low, even in those days, that it is a little difficult to surmise for what purpose she was designed, especially as this design was more or less contemporary with the re-designing of the _Dreadnought_.[6] It found favour, however, since she was almost immediately followed by two larger replicas, the _Nelson_ and the _Northampton_, details of which were:--
Displacement--7,630 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--280ft.
Draught (maximum)--26ft. 6in.
Armour--Belt amidships, 9in. to 6in., compound: bulkhead ditto. Armour deck only, at ends.
Main Armament--Four 18-ton M.L.R., eight 12-ton M.L.R., two above-water 14-inch torpedo tubes.
Coal carried--1,150 tons = nominal radius of 3,850 miles.
These ships differed from the _Shannon_ in that the armour belt was confined to a water-line strip amidships, while the after guns were also protected by a bulkhead. The most curious, and to modern ideas, eccentric feature of these ships, was that they were fitted with triangular rams, which, “for the sake of safety,” could be removed in peace time and merely put on for war purposes! As a matter of fact, the ships always carried their rams without rendering themselves dangerous to anybody. On the other hand, shortly after construction, the _Northampton_ was run into by a small trading schooner, which cut her down to the water’s edge. The ships, therefore, started with an unfavourable reputation, which the _Northampton_ followed up by a total inability to make even her moderate designed speed. The _Nelson_, on the other hand, proved herself a comparatively good steamer, so much so that at a later date she was to a certain extent modernised. Both ships were originally heavily masted, the idea being to perform most of their peace service when convenient under sail. The _Nelson_ sailed moderately well, but the _Northampton_ very badly. It was possibly with some view to remedying this that some years later, when it was decided that the _Imperieuse_, originally built as a brig, should be given a military rig, her lofty iron fore and mainmast were taken out of her and substituted for the two equivalent masts in the _Northampton_. The change, however, was not satisfactory, as thereafter she sailed if anything worse than ever.
At and about this year protected cruisers made their first appearance in the _Comus_ class. Of these altogether eleven were built, the best known of these being the _Calliope_, which in the early nineties became famous through steaming out of Samoa Roads in the teeth of a hurricane, which utterly destroyed every foreign vessel anchored there at the same time. The _Comus_ class consisted of the _Calliope_, _Calypso_, _Canada_, _Carysfort_, _Champion_, _Cleopatra_, _Comus_, _Conquest_, _Constance_, _Cordelia_, and _Curacoa_. They averaged 2,380 tons displacement, though the first mentioned, which were the last to be built, were slightly larger. The original armament consisted of two 6-ton muzzle-loaders and twelve 64-pounders. This was afterwards varied by the substitution of breechloaders. The ships generally had a speed of about thirteen knots, and were completed between the years 1877, for the earliest, and 1884 for the latest. They had a 1½-inch protective deck for the engines amidships. These ships, which were generally officially known as the “C” class cruiser, were undoubtedly diminutives of the _Shannon_, or, at any rate, inspired by a similar idea.
Besides growing downwards the idea also grew upwards, and resulted in the building of six ships of the “Admiral” class, of which the first was the _Collingwood_. These, which were the apotheosis of the Barnaby idea, represented an absolute revolution in naval construction, so far as big ships were concerned.
The “Admirals” were not all identical, as they formed four different groups in the matter of displacement and three in armament. In all, however, the integral idea was the same. Amidships was a narrow belt, 150ft. long by 7½ft. wide, which sufficed to protect engines, boilers, and communication tubes of the barbettes. This belt varied in thickness from 18ins. to 8ins, of compound armour. The ends of the belt were closed up by 16-inch bulkheads. Forward and aft was merely a curved protective deck; there was also a flat protective deck on top of the armour belt. The ships were of low freeboard, forward and aft, but had a large superstructure built up amidships. At either end of the superstructure, with their bases unprotected by armour except for the communication tubes already referred to, were many-sided barbettes with plates set at an angle of about forty-five degrees. These barbettes were about 11½ins. thick, and carried each a couple of the heaviest guns then available. These were 12-inch breechloaders in the _Collingwood_, and 13.5-inch in the other ships, except the _Benbow_, which mounted one 16.5 inch 110-ton in each barbette instead. An auxiliary armament was mounted inside the superstructure. The speed of these ships was about seventeen knots, and was considerably in excess of the average for the period.
=====================+====================+=====================+=====================+==================== Name. | _Collingwood._ | _Rodney_, | _Anson_, | _Benbow._ | | _Howe._ | _Camperdown._ | ---------------------+--------------------+---------------------+---------------------+-------------------- Displacement, tons | 9,500 | 10,300 | 10,600 | 10,600 | | | | Length (_p.p._) ft.| 325 | 325 | 330 | 330 | | | | Beam, ft. | 68 | 68 | 68½ | 68½ | | | | Draught (_mean_) ft. | 26¾ | 27¼ | 26¾ | 27¼ | | | | H.P. | 9,500 | 11,500 | 11,500 | 11,500 | | | | Nominal Speed, | | | | knots | 16.5 | 16.7 | 17.2 | 17.5 | | | | Armament | 4--12in., 6--6in. | 4--13.5, 6--6in. | 4--13.5, 6--6 in. | 2--16.25, 10--6in. | | | | Built at | Pembroke Yard | _Rodney_, | _Anson_, | Thames, I.W. | | Chatham Yd. | Pembroke Yd. | | | _Howe_, Pembroke Yd.| _Camperdown_, | | | Chatham Yd. | Por’th. | | | | | Engines by | Humphrys | _Rodney_, Humphrys | _Anson_, Humphrys | Maudslay | | _Howe_, Humphrys | _Camperdown_, Maud’y| | | | | Armour belt | 18in.-8in. | 18in.-8in. | 18in.-8in. | 18in.-8in. | | | | barbettes | 14in.-12in. | 11½in.-10in. | 16in.-6in. | 12in.-4in. | | | | bulkheads | 16in.-6in. | 16in.-6in. | 14in.-12in. | 18in.-6in.* | | | | Armament | 4--12in., 6--6in., | 4--13.5, 6--6in., | 4--13.5, 6--6in., | 2--16.25, 10--6in., | and smaller, | and smaller, | and smaller, | and smaller, | 2 sub. and 4 | as _Collingwood_ | as _Collingwood_ | as _Collingwood_ | above water tubes | | | =====================+====================+=====================+=====================+====================
As compared with the _Colossus_ and _Edinburgh_ class of the same date and era of design, the “Admirals” were somewhat inferior in armour protection, but because of that secured a far better speed and a greatly superior big gun command.
In all the “Admiral” class the armour weighed about 2,500 tons--say, 20 per cent. of the displacement. This proportion has never been very greatly varied from either before or since, and the popular idea that Barnaby designs sacrificed armour weight for other features is entirely incorrect. The real Barnaby ideal is better described (the conditions of his own time being kept in mind) as an attempt to put into practice “everything or nothing,” so far as protection was concerned. To-day, a compromise is in fashion, and Barnaby is very much out of date. It may well be but a phase in the cycle of naval design. Properly to appreciate the _Admiral_ class ideal, we have to translate it into the ideal which obtains to-day. Thus put, the _Admirals_ would be somewhat swifter than our existing battle-cruisers, their vitals would be invulnerable and their armaments superior to that of any potential enemy. They would not, in fact, very greatly differ from Admiral Bacon’s conception (published some five years before the present war) of the battleship of the future, in which he predicted the disappearance of much of the side armour of to-day.
THE _BENBOW_--A SHIP OF THE “ADMIRAL” CLASS.]
The coming of the medium calibre quick-firer soon rendered the “Admirals” obsolete and even ridiculous. The medium calibre quick-firer profoundly modified design until the development of the big gun enabled it to act well beyond the effective range of the medium gun, and incidentally enabled it to fire nearly as fast as the elementary quick-firers were built to do. Thus we have come back to something very akin to the condition under which the Barnaby ships were designed.
These ships could not, perhaps, be described as an absolutely original idea, save in so far as the British Navy was concerned, since the Italian _Italia_ was launched in the same year that the _Collingwood_, the first of the “Admirals” was laid down. The _Italia_, equally abnormally fast (or faster) for the period, carried four 100-ton guns échelonned in one large heavily armoured barbette amidships, but had no water-line belt whatever, and relied entirely upon an armour-deck to protect the motive power. In the “Admirals” the motive power was thoroughly protected by the vertical belt amidships, while flotation otherwise depended upon internal sub-divisions.
Fred T. Jane opens this second volume with the Barnaby era, a period when the Royal Navy shifted from broadside ironclads to turret ships and barbette designs. The book’s structure moves chronologically through four chief eras—Barnaby, White, Watts, and Dreadnought—each named after the Director of Naval Construction who shaped its ships. Jane’s method is to present technical data, trial results, and design rationales, often contrasting the original intentions with the ships’ actual performance at sea. The volume also includes chapters on submarines, naval aviation, and auxiliary navies, extending the scope beyond battleships alone.
Recurring Design Trade-offs
Throughout the volume, Jane returns to a central tension: the balance between armour, armament, and speed. In the White era, for instance, he notes that the Majestic-class battleships sacrificed some armour thickness to achieve a higher freeboard and better seakeeping. Later, describing the Invincible-class battle cruisers, he observes that they “sacrificed a certain amount of armour in order to obtain a greater speed.” Jane does not merely list specifications; he evaluates the consequences of each choice. The Invincible class, he writes, “have turned out to be wonderful steamers, but considerably inferior sea-boats to the Dreadnought.” This pattern of comparing design promises with operational realities recurs across the chapters, giving the book a critical edge that goes beyond a simple catalogue of ships.
The Dreadnought as a Turning Point
The chapter on the Dreadnought era is the volume’s centrepiece. Jane credits General Cuniberti with first proposing the all-big-gun battleship, but he carefully distinguishes Cuniberti’s theoretical paper from the actual design of HMS Dreadnought. He also discusses Professor Hovgaard’s alternative concept for an armoured cruiser. Jane’s treatment of the three companion ships—Invincible, Inflexible, and Indomitable—is particularly detailed: he provides their displacement, dimensions, armament, armour, machinery, and trial speeds, noting that all three exceeded their designed horsepower. Yet he also points out a practical flaw: “there are very few positions in which they can bring more than six big guns to bear.” This blend of tabular data and critical commentary is characteristic of Jane’s approach throughout the volume.
Movement Between Eras and Technologies
Jane structures the narrative as a series of transitions, each marked by a new construction programme or a shift in strategic thinking. The chapter on the White era, for example, follows the Barnaby era and shows how the Navy moved from turret ships to the pre-dreadnought battleships of the Royal Sovereign class. Later, the Watts era introduces the pre-dreadnoughts that immediately preceded the Dreadnought. Jane also traces the cyclical nature of design: he notes that Italy’s Duilio and Dandolo were the “Dreadnought of that period,” and that later Italian ships abandoned side armour before returning to it. This sense of historical recurrence—where the same debates about armour versus speed reappear in different decades—gives the book a unifying theme beyond its chronological structure.
Illustrations and Technical Diagrams
The volume is illustrated with colour plates by W. L. Wyllie, R.A., as well as numerous plans, diagrams, and photographs. The colour plates depict scenes such as “Dreadnoughts Anchoring—1912” and “Submarines Leaving Portsmouth Harbour,” while the diagrams include “Systems of Water-Line Protection” and “Alternative Designs for the Dreadnought.” These visuals are not decorative; they are integral to Jane’s argument. The plans allow the reader to compare the layout of turrets and armour belts across different classes. The photographs of ships like Inflexible as originally completed in 1881 provide a visual record of how designs changed over time. Jane’s text frequently refers to these illustrations, making the book a coordinated work of text and image.
Readers interested in the technical evolution of warship design will find Jane’s volume a valuable primary source, written by a contemporary observer who had access to official data and personal correspondence with naval architects. The book’s strength lies in its willingness to point out where designs fell short of expectations, and in its recognition that naval architecture is a series of compromises. For those who wish to trace the lineage of the dreadnought battleship, this volume offers a detailed, era-by-era account grounded in the specifics of each class.
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