The New York Subway, Its Construction and Equipment — Reading Companion

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Interborough Rapid Transit Company Project Gutenberg 2006
Subways -- New York (State) -- New York; Local transit -- New York (State) -- New York Readers of public-domain and historical texts
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Words: 51,073
Reading time: 223 min
Text sections: 8
A detailed technical report by the Interborough Rapid Transit Company on the construction and equipment of New York's first subway, featuring precise specifications for power plants, electrical systems, and rolling stock, with a focus on engineering choices and infrastructure.
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CHAPTER I. THE ROUTE OF THE ROAD--PASSENGER STATIONS AND TRACKS, 23

CHAPTER II. TYPES AND METHODS OF CONSTRUCTION, 37

CHAPTER III. POWER HOUSE BUILDING, 67

CHAPTER IV. POWER PLANT FROM COAL PILE TO SHAFTS OF ENGINES AND TURBINES, 77

CHAPTER V. SYSTEM OF ELECTRICAL SUPPLY, 91

CHAPTER VI. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT OF CARS, 117

CHAPTER VII. LIGHTING SYSTEM FOR PASSENGER STATIONS AND TUNNEL, 121

CHAPTER VIII. ROLLING STOCK--CARS, TRUCKS, ETC., 125

CHAPTER IX. SIGNAL SYSTEM, 135

CHAPTER X. SUBWAY DRAINAGE, 145

CHAPTER XI. REPAIR AND INSPECTION SHED, 147

CHAPTER XII. SUB-CONTRACTORS, 151

INTERBOROUGH RAPID TRANSIT COMPANY

August Belmont E. P. Bryan Andrew Freedman James Jourdan Gardiner M. Lane John B. McDonald Walter G. Oakman John Peirce Morton F. Plant William A. Read Alfred Skitt Cornelius Vanderbilt George W. Young

_Executive Committee_

August Belmont Andrew Freedman James Jourdan Walter G. Oakman William A. Read Cornelius Vanderbilt

August Belmont, President E. P. Bryan, Vice-president H. M. Fisher, Secretary D. W. McWilliams, Treasurer E. F. J. Gaynor, Auditor Frank Hedley, General Superintendent S. L. F. Deyo, Chief Engineer George W. Wickersham, General Counsel Chas. A. Gardiner, General Attorney DeLancey Nicoll, Associate Counsel Alfred A. Gardner, Associate Counsel

S. L. F. Deyo, Chief Engineer.

_Electrical Equipment_

L. B. Stillwell, Electrical Director. H. N. Latey, Principal Assistant. Frederick R. Slater, Assistant Engineer in charge of Third Rail Construction. Albert F. Parks, Assistant Engineer in charge of Lighting. George G. Raymond, Assistant Engineer in charge of Conduits and Cables. William B. Flynn, Assistant Engineer in charge of Draughting Room.

_Mechanical and Architectural_

J. Van Vleck, Mechanical and Construction Engineer. William C. Phelps, Assistant Construction Engineer. William N. Stevens, Ass't Mechanical Engineer. Paul C. Hunter, Architectural Assistant. Geo. E. Thomas, Supervising Engineer in Field.

_Cars and Signal System_

George Gibbs, Consulting Engineer. Watson T. Thompson, Master Mechanic. J. N. Waldron, Signal Engineer.

RAPID TRANSIT SUBWAY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

August Belmont E. P. Bryan Andrew Freedman James Jourdan Gardiner M. Lane Walther Luttgen John B. McDonald Walter G. Oakman John Peirce Morton F. Plant William A. Read Cornelius Vanderbilt George W. Young

_Executive Committee_

August Belmont Andrew Freedman James Jourdan Walter G. Oakman William A. Read Cornelius Vanderbilt

August Belmont, president Walter G. Oakman, vice-president John B. McDonald, contractor H. M. Fisher, secretary John F. Buck, treasurer E. F. J. Gaynor, auditor S. L. F. Deyo, chief engineer George W. Wickersham, general counsel Alfred A. Gardner, attorney

S. L. F. Deyo, Chief Engineer. H. T. Douglas, Principal Assistant Engineer.

A. Edward Olmsted, Division Engineer, Manhattan-Bronx Lines.

Henry B. Reed, Division Engineer, Brooklyn Extension.

Theodore Paschke, Resident Engineer, First Division, City Hall to 33d Street, also Brooklyn Extension, City Hall to Bowling Green; and Robert S. Fowler, Assistant.

Ernest C. Moore, Resident Engineer, Second Division, 33d Street to 104th Street; and Stanley Raymond, Assistant.

William C. Merryman, Resident Engineer, Third Division, Underground Work, 104th Street to Fort George West Side and Westchester Avenue East Side; and William B. Leonard, W. A. Morton, and William E. Morris, Jr., Assistants.

Allan A. Robbins and Justin Burns, Resident Engineers, Fourth Division, Viaducts; and George I. Oakley, Assistant.

Frank D. Leffingwell, Resident Engineer, East River Tunnel Division, Brooklyn Extension; and C. D. Drew, Assistant.

Percy Litchfield, Resident Engineer, Fifth Division, Brooklyn Extension, Borough Hall to Prospect Park; and Edward R. Eichner, Assistant.

M. C. Hamilton, Engineer, Maintenance of Way; and Robert E. Brandeis, Assistant.

D. L. Turner, Assistant Engineer in charge of Stations.

A. Samuel Berquist, Assistant Engineer in charge of Steel Erection.

William J. Boucher, Assistant Engineer in charge of Draughting Rooms.

The completion of the rapid transit railroad in the boroughs of Manhattan and The Bronx, which is popularly known as the "Subway," has demonstrated that underground railroads can be built beneath the congested streets of the city, and has made possible in the near future a comprehensive system of subsurface transportation extending throughout the wide territory of Greater New York.

In March, 1900, when the Mayor with appropriate ceremonies broke ground at the Borough Hall, in Manhattan, for the new road, there were many well-informed people, including prominent financiers and experienced engineers, who freely prophesied failure for the enterprise, although the contract had been taken by a most capable contractor, and one of the best known banking houses in America had committed itself to finance the undertaking.

In looking at the finished road as a completed work, one is apt to wonder why it ever seemed impossible and to forget the difficulties which confronted the builders at the start.

The railway was to be owned by the city, and built and operated under legislation unique in the history of municipal governments, complicated, and minute in provisions for the occupation of the city streets, payment of moneys by the city, and city supervision over construction and operation. Questions as to the interpretation of these provisions might have to be passed upon by the courts, with delays, how serious none could foretell, especially in New York where the crowded calendars retard speedy decisions. The experience of the elevated railroad corporations in building their lines had shown the uncertainty of depending upon legal precedents. It was not, at that time, supposed that the abutting property owners would have any legal ground for complaint against the elevated structures, but the courts found new laws for new conditions and spelled out new property rights of light, air, and access, which were made the basis for a volume of litigation unprecedented in the courts of any country.

An underground railroad was a new condition. None could say that the abutting property owners might not find rights substantial enough, at least, to entitle them to their day in court, a day which, in this State, might stretch into many months, or even several years. Owing to the magnitude of the work, delay might easily result in failure. An eminent judge of the New York Supreme Court had emphasized the uncertainties of the situation in the following language: "Just what are the rights of the owners of property abutting upon a street or avenue, the fee in and to the soil underneath the surface of which has been acquired by the city of New York, so far as the same is not required for the ordinary city uses of gas or water pipes, or others of a like character, has never been finally determined. We have now the example of the elevated railroad, constructed and operated in the city of New York under legislative and municipal authority for nearly twenty years, which has been compelled to pay many millions of dollars to abutting property owners for the easement in the public streets appropriated by the construction and maintenance of the road, and still the amount that the road will have to pay is not ascertained. What liabilities will be imposed upon the city under this contract; what injury the construction and operation of this road will cause to abutting property, and what easements and rights will have to be acquired before the road can be legally constructed and operated, it is impossible now to ascertain."

It is true, that the city undertook "to secure to the contractor the right to construct and operate, free from all rights, claims, or other interference, whether by injunction, suit for damages, or otherwise on the part of any abutting owner or other person." But another eminent judge of the same court had characterized this as "a condition absolutely impossible of fulfillment," and had said: "How is the city to prevent interference with the work by injunction? That question lies with the courts; and not with the courts of this State alone, for there are cases without doubt in which the courts of the United States would have jurisdiction to act, and when such jurisdiction exists they have not hitherto shown much reluctance in acting.... That legal proceedings will be undertaken which will, to some extent at least, interfere with the progress of this work seems to be inevitable...."

Another difficulty was that the Constitution of the State of New York limited the debt-incurring power of the city. The capacity of the city to undertake the work had been much discussed in the courts, and the Supreme Court of the State had disposed of that phase of the situation by suggesting that it did not make much difference to the municipality whether or not the debt limit permitted a contract for the work, because if the limit should be exceeded, "no liability could possibly be imposed upon the city," a view which might comfort the timid taxpayers but could hardly be expected to give confidence to the capitalists who might undertake the execution of the contract.

Various corporations, organized during the thirty odd years of unsuccessful attempts by the city to secure underground rapid transit, claimed that their franchises gave them vested rights in the streets to the exclusion of the new enterprise, and they were prepared to assert their rights in the courts. (The Underground Railroad Company of the City of New York sought to enjoin the building of the road and carried their contest to the Supreme Court of the United States which did not finally decide the questions raised until March, 1904, when the subway was practically complete.)

Rival transportation companies stood ready to obstruct the work and encourage whomever might find objection to the building of the road.

New York has biennial elections. The road could not be completed in two years, and the attitude of one administration might not be the attitude of its successors.

The engineering difficulties were well-nigh appalling. Towering buildings along the streets had to be considered, and the streets themselves were already occupied with a complicated network of subsurface structures, such as sewers, water and gas mains, electric cable conduits, electric surface railway conduits, telegraph and power conduits, and many vaults extending out under the streets, occupied by the abutting property owners. On the surface were street railway lines carrying a very heavy traffic night and day, and all the thoroughfares in the lower part of the city were congested with vehicular traffic.

Finally, the city was unwilling to take any risk, and demanded millions of dollars of security to insure the completion of the road according to the contract, the terms of which were most exacting down to the smallest detail.

The builders of the road did not underestimate the magnitude of the task before them. They retained the most experienced experts for every part of the work and, perfecting an organization in an incredibly short time, proceeded to surmount and sweep aside difficulties. The result is one of which every citizen of New York may feel proud. Upon the completion of the road the city will own the best constructed and best equipped intraurban rapid transit railroad in the world. The efforts of the builders have not been limited by the strict terms of the contract. They have striven, not to equal the best devices, but to improve upon the best devices used in modern electrical railroading, to secure for the traveling public safety, comfort, and speedy transportation.

The road is off the surface and escapes the delays incident to congested city streets, but near the surface and accessible, light, dry, clean, and well ventilated. The stations and approaches are commodious, and the stations themselves furnish conveniences to passengers heretofore not heard of on intraurban lines. There is a separate express service, with its own tracks, and the stations are so arranged that passengers may pass from local trains to express trains, and vice versa, without delay and without payment of additional fare. Special precautions have been taken and devices adopted to prevent a failure of the electric power and the consequent delays of traffic. An electro pneumatic block signal system has been devised, which excels any system heretofore used and is unique in its mechanism. The third rail for conveying the electric current is covered, so as to prevent injury to passengers and employees from contact. Special emergency and fire alarm signal systems are installed throughout the length of the road. At a few stations, where the road is not near the surface, improved escalators and elevators are provided. The cars have been designed to prevent danger from fire, and improved types of motors have been adopted, capable of supplying great speed combined with complete control. Strength, utility, and convenience have not alone been considered, but all parts of the railroad structures and equipment, stations, power house, and electrical sub-stations have been designed and constructed with a view to the beauty of their appearance, as well as to their efficiency.

The completion of the subway marks the solution of a problem which for over thirty years baffled the people of New York City, in spite of the best efforts of many of its foremost citizens. An extended account of Rapid Transit Legislation would be out of place here, but a brief glance at the history of the Act under the authority of which the subway has been built is necessary to a clear understanding of the work which has been accomplished. From 1850 to 1865 the street surface horse railways were sufficient for the requirements of the traveling public. As the city grew rapidly, the congestion spreading northward, to and beyond the Harlem River, the service of surface roads became entirely inadequate. As early as 1868, forty-two well known business men of the city became, by special legislative Act, incorporators of the New York City Central Underground Railway Company, to build a line from the City Hall to the Harlem River. The names of the incorporators evidenced the seriousness of the attempt, but nothing came of it. In 1872, also by special Act, Cornelius Vanderbilt and others were incorporated as The New York City Rapid Transit Company, to build an underground road from the City Hall to connect with the New York & Harlem Road at 59th Street, with a branch to the tracks of the New York Central Road. The enterprise was soon abandoned. Numerous companies were incorporated in the succeeding years under the general railroad laws, to build underground roads, but without results; among them the Central Tunnel Railway Company in 1881, The New York & New Jersey Tunnel Railway Company in 1883, The Terminal Underground Railway Company in 1886, The Underground Railroad Company of the City of New York (a consolidation of the last two companies) in 1896, and The Rapid Transit Underground Railroad Company in 1897.

All attempts to build a road under the early special charter and later under the general laws having failed, the city secured in 1891 the passage of the Rapid Transit Act under which, as amended, the subway has been built. As originally passed it did not provide for municipal ownership. It provided that a board of five rapid transit railroad commissioners might adopt routes and general plans for a railroad, obtain the consents of the local authorities and abutting property owners, or in lieu of the consents of the property owners the approval of the Supreme Court; and then, having adopted detail plans for the construction and operation, might sell at public sale the right to build and operate the road to a corporation, whose powers and duties were defined in the Act, for such period of time and on such terms as they could. The Commissioners prepared plans and obtained the consents of the local authorities. The property owners refused their consent; the Supreme Court gave its approval in lieu thereof, but upon inviting bids the Board of Rapid Transit Railroad Commissioners found no responsible bidder.

The late Hon. Abram S. Hewitt, as early as 1884, when legislation for underground roads was under discussion, had urged municipal ownership. Speaking in 1901, he said of his efforts in 1884:

"It was evident to me that underground rapid transit could not be secured by the investment of private capital, but in some way or other its construction was dependent upon the use of the credit of the City of New York. It was also apparent to me that if such credit were used, the property must belong to the city. Inasmuch as it would not be safe for the city to undertake the construction itself, the intervention of a contracting company appeared indispensable. To secure the city against loss, this company must necessarily be required to give a sufficient bond for the completion of the work and be willing to enter into a contract for its continued operation under a rental which would pay the interest upon the bonds issued by the city for the construction, and provide a sinking fund sufficient for the payment of the bonds at or before maturity. It also seemed to be indispensable that the leasing company should invest in the rolling stock and in the real estate required for its power houses and other buildings an amount of money sufficiently large to indemnify the city against loss in case the lessees should fail in their undertaking to build and operate the railroad."

Mr. Hewitt became Mayor of the city in 1887, and his views were presented in the form of a Bill to the Legislature in the following year. The measure found practically no support. Six years later, after the Rapid Transit Commissioners had failed under the Act of 1891, as originally drawn, to obtain bidders for the franchise, the New York Chamber of Commerce undertook to solve the problem by reverting to Mr. Hewitt's idea of municipal ownership. Whether or not municipal ownership would meet the approval of the citizens of New York could not be determined; therefore, as a preliminary step, it was decided to submit the question to a popular vote. An amendment to the Act of 1891 was drawn (Chapter 752 of the Laws of 1894) which provided that the qualified electors of the city were to decide at an annual election, by ballot, whether the rapid transit railway or railways should be constructed by the city and at the public's expense, and be operated under lease from the city, or should be constructed by a private corporation under a franchise to be sold in the manner attempted unsuccessfully, under the Act of 1891, as originally passed. At the fall election of 1894, the electors of the city, by a very large vote, declared against the sale of a franchise to a private corporation and in favor of ownership by the city. Several other amendments, the necessity for which developed as plans for the railway were worked out, were made up to and including the session of the Legislature of 1900, but the general scheme for rapid transit may be said to have become fixed when the electors declared in favor of municipal ownership. The main provisions of the legislation which stood upon the statute books as the Rapid Transit Act, when the contract was finally executed, February 21, 1900, may be briefly summarized as follows:

(_a_) The Act was general in terms, applying to all cities in the State having a population of over one million; it was special in effect because New York was the only city having such a population. It did not limit the Rapid Transit Commissioners to the building of a single road, but authorized the laying out of successive roads or extensions.

(_b_) A Board was created consisting of the Mayor, Comptroller, or other chief financial officer of the city; the president of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, by virtue of his office, and five members named in the Act: William Steinway, Seth Low, John Claflin, Alexander E. Orr, and John H. Starin, men distinguished for their business experience, high integrity, and civic pride. Vacancies in the Board were to be filled by the Board itself, a guaranty of a continued uniform policy.

(_c_) The Board was to prepare general routes and plans and submit the question of municipal ownership to the electors of the city.

(_d_) The city was authorized, in the event that the electors decided for city ownership, to issue bonds not to exceed $50,000,000 for the construction of the road or roads and $5,000,000 additional, if necessary, for acquiring property rights for the route. The interest on the bonds was not to exceed 3-1/2 per cent.

The New York Subway, Its Construction and Equipment is a technical report issued by the Interborough Rapid Transit Company in 1904, documenting the engineering decisions behind the city's first underground railway. Unlike a historical narrative, this volume presents precise specifications for power generation, electrical distribution, and rolling stock, with tables of steam consumption and detailed descriptions of turbo-generators and exciter engines. The catalog subjects—subways and local transit—frame the work, but the excerpts reveal a narrower focus: the mechanical and electrical systems that made the subway operational, rather than its route or passenger experience.

Engineering Specifications as Primary Content

The excerpts are dominated by quantitative data: steam pressures, kilowatt outputs, and guaranteed fuel consumption rates. For example, the turbo-generators are described as operating at 1,200 revolutions per minute with a normal output of 1,700 electrical horse power. The text lists steam consumption at various loads, such as 15.7 pounds per electrical horse-power hour at full load. This level of detail suggests the intended audience was engineers and investors, not general readers. The catalog subject “Subways” might imply a broader scope, but the actual content is a technical manual for the subway's power and electrical systems.

Organizational Structure and Corporate Authorship

The book is organized by system: power house, electrical supply, car equipment, lighting, signals, and drainage. Each chapter addresses a specific component, with the power plant receiving the most detailed treatment. The title page lists the Interborough Rapid Transit Company as author, and the front matter includes a full roster of directors, officers, and engineering staff. This corporate authorship aligns with the catalog subject “Local transit,” but the excerpts show the work functions as an internal or promotional document, emphasizing the company's technical competence rather than transit operations or urban impact.

What the Excerpts Omit: Route, Stations, and Ridership

Despite the catalog subjects, the excerpts contain no description of the subway's route, station locations, or passenger capacity. The table of contents lists chapters on passenger stations and tracks, but the provided text focuses entirely on the power house and electrical equipment. The introduction and early chapters are not included, so the reader cannot assess how the route was chosen or how stations were designed. This gap highlights the editorial lens: the catalog subjects suggest a comprehensive treatment of subways and transit, but the available evidence shows a technical monograph on engineering systems, with human and urban elements largely absent.

Readers approaching this work should expect a dense technical document rather than a history or guide. The book rewards those interested in early 20th-century electrical engineering and infrastructure, but it offers little about the subway's social or urban context. The absence of route maps, station plans, or ridership data means the catalog subjects may mislead casual readers. For a fuller picture, one would need to consult contemporary newspaper accounts or municipal reports that complement this engineering perspective.

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